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Insurance Subrogation in Auto Medical
Payments Coverage
Walter A. Rodgers*
T HE ISSUE OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY suing in its own name to recover
payments for medical bills already paid for its insured has been
the subject of much confusion. An automobile insurance policy designed
to resolve this confusion was introduced by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters and National Automobile Underwriters Associa-
tion in a number of states in September, 1959. The Mutual Insurance
Rating Bureau helped revise the 1959 introductory policy in 1963; and
created the "Special Package Automobile Form" (hereinafter referred
to as Special Policy). The policy was designed for private passenger
and utility automobiles; it has a maximum effective term of six months,
and is a highly competitive policy in the insurance market.1 This new
form differed markedly from the "Family Automobile Policy," which
was the traditional policy designed for the same class of automobiles and
is still in wide use today.
The Special Policy was distinct primarily in that it attempted to
eliminate duplication of coverage and unjust enrichment to an injured
party. It provided:
(1) a set-off provision against liability coverage (or the requirement
of a covenant not to sue for medical expense),
(2) an exclusion of benefits where there is other insurance against
such loss and
(3) a subrogation clause.2
It is unnecessary to elaborate on the other major differences be-
tween the two policies as this study will be confined to a discussion of the
provisions of the Medical Payments Coverage with an analysis of the
treatment these provisions have received by various courts, and more
particularly, to resolving the question of whether the subrogation of
medical expenses by automobile insurers is an assignment of a bodily
injury claim.
Policy Language
The usual policy language of the Medical Payments Coverage pro-
vides as follows:
"To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the
date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental
* B.S., Clarion State College; Fourth-year student, Cleveland State Univ., Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law; Claim Representative, Reliance Insurance Company.
1 See Fire, Casualty, Surety Bulletins (C & S sections), AS-i, Fifth Printing, 1963.
2 Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept?, 28 Ins.
Counsel J. 277 (1961).
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services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance,
hospital, professional nursing and funeral services. . .. ,, 3
As already mentioned, one of the new features of the Special Policy is
the insertion of a subrogation clause, an example of which reads:
"In the event of any payment under the Medical Expense Coverage
of this policy, insurer shall be subrogated to all the rights of re-
covery thereof which the injured person or anyone receiving such
payment may have against any person or organization and such
person shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do
whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such person shall
do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights." 4
There are two problems insurers face when issuing such policies.
One problem, that might develop in those states which do not have Guest
Passenger Statutes, is the double recovery dilemma. This arises when
a passenger has his medical expenses paid under the Medical Payments
Coverage and then seeks to recover the medical expenses again in a per-
sonal injury action against the insured driver. The second, and most
crucial problem, occurs when the insurer, after having paid the medical
expenses of the injured person, seeks to be subrogated to the rights of
that injured person against the tortfeasor.
The subrogation provision clearly makes specific reference to Medi-
cal Payments. Indeed, in a memorandum explaining this Special Policy,
the National Bureau stated:
Underwriters have been greatly concerned for some time that
standard forms of automobile liability insurance and medical pay-
ments coverage have been affording benefits which by reason of
their duplication within the policy and with other forms of in-
surance result in unintended, and in some cases actually unjust en-
richment to the insureds and claimants involved in automobile acci-
dents in that they have been recovering more than once for the
same medical expenses. This form is newly conceived on the prin-
ciple that the named insurer is neither legally nor morally bound to
provide certain of these unjust benefits and that this policy should
be designed so that such benefits are not recoverable. 5
Thus, the intent of the provisions is clear and unambiguous, the most im-
portant of which is the stipulation for subrogation. In effect, this stipu-
lation is an extension of an insurer's right of subrogation where it would
seemingly not otherwise be available. This will be dealt with in a later
discussion.
3 Reliance Insurance Company, Family Automobile Combination Policy, p. 2 (Nov.,
1966).
4 Planet Insurance Company, V.I.P. Thrift Automobile Policy, p. 8 (April, 1965).
5 Katz, supra n. 2 at 277.
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Historical Development of Assignments of Claims Ex Delicto
The most consistent, and perhaps the most narrow, argument which
some courts adhere to today in failing to allow the right of subrogation
of medical expenses is that the insured's (subrogor's) transfer of his
rights to medical expenses to the insurer (subrogee) is an assignment
of a claim ex delicto and is, therefore, void. Historically, claims ex
delicto were not capable of assignment. This common law principle was
universally accepted.0 A frequently cited case in point is Rice v. Stone,7
wherein the court answered the question of whether a personal injury
claim was assignable. In adhering to the common law rule, the court
listed two reasons for holding the assignment invalid: (1) to avoid main-
tenance; and (2) prior to judgment the assignor has nothing that can
be assigned.
Thus, the common law test for the assignability of a claim de-
pended on its survival. There being no survival statutes at common law,
a claim for personal injury ceased to exist when the injured party died.
The desire to avoid maintenance was conceived to forbid unprincipled
people from purchasing personal injury claims and thereby preventing
them from prosecuting these claims for pain and suffering. The early
courts' reasoning led to what might have been a wise conclusion at the
time, but it is doubtful whether there is any force left to this argument
today.
With the introduction of survival statutes in most of the states, it
should syllogistically follow that claims ex delicto are capable of assign-
ment. The survival statutes, of course, permit a personal injury claim
to survive the death of the injured person. Some survival statutes are
not as broadly stated as others; 8 i.e., some states maintain that personal
injury claims are not capable of assignment until reduced to judgment.
There would appear to be little justification for consistently holding
the assignment of a personal injury claim invalid if the statutes were as
broad as they could be. This is true inasmuch as the common law test
of survivability has been met.
Assignment and Subrogation in General
It is not difficult to recognize that the concept of subrogation is dis-
tinct from that of assignment. In distinguishing subrogation from as-
signment, it has been said that:
Subrogation is the substitution of another person in the place of
the creditor, so that the person substituted will succeed to the rights
6 Restatement, Contracts sec. 547 (1932); see also Annot. 40 A.L.R. 2d 500 and 40-48
A.L.R. 2d Later Case Service 45; Prosser, Torts 920 (3d edition, 1964); Kimball and
Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 841 (1962).
7 83 Mass. 566 (1913).
8 Prosser, Torts, note 44 at 924 (3d edition, 1964).
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of the creditor in relation to the debt or claim, and is an act of the
law-growing out of the relations of the parties to the original con-
tract of insurance, and the natural justice or equities arising from
the fact that the insurer has paid the insured, rather than a right
depending upon the contract. On the other hand, an assignment of
a right or claim is the act of the parties to the assignment, depend-
ent upon actual intention, and necessarily contemplating the con-
tinued existence of the debt or claim, the whole of which is as-
signed.9
The operational effect and purpose of subrogation is that it seeks con-
tribution and indemnity, while an assignment is the transfer of the whole
claim.10
Subrogation can be of two kinds, either legal or conventional. One
court construes legal subrogation as:
a creature of equity not depending upon contract, but upon the
equities of the parties. In its more usual aspect, it arises by opera-
tion of law where one having a liability or right or a fiduciary rela-
tion in the premises pays a debt owing by another under such cir-
cumstances that he is in equity entitled to the security or obligation
held by the creditor whom he paid."
Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is simply the agreement
of parties to a contract, wherein one party pays the other, then that
party will seek indemnification by being subrogated to the rights of the
party for whom the payment was made. 12 It would seem then that con-
ventional subrogation should be capable of extending the right of sub-
rogation to those situations where it would otherwise not be available.
Insurer's Right of Subrogation
As was mentioned, a clear distinction exists between subrogation
and assignment. From this there emerges the question of whether an
insurer has the right of subrogation; specifically, does the insurer have
a right of subrogation of medical expenses resulting from automobile
accidents?
Absent contractual stipulation (conventional subrogation) an in-
surer would not be subrogated to its insured's rights of recovery for
medical expenses from the tortfeasor. Generally Medical Payments
9 16 Couch, Insurance 2d 61:92 (Curr. ed.).
10 6 CJ.S. Assignments 26 at 1074.
11 General Creditors of Estate of Harris v. Cornett, 416 P. 2d 398, 400 (Okl. Sup. Ct.,
1966; see also 50 Am. Jur. 681; 83 C.J.S. Subrogation 3 at 583.
12 See 50 Am. Jur. 681 for a discussion on the distinction between legal and conven-
tional subrogation. See also Kimball and Davis, supra note 6 at 844, where the au-
thors outline those types of insurance policies to which legal subrogation is said to be
available and even suggest that conventional subrogation could extend the right of
subrogation of life insurance policies.
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Coverage is a form of accident insurance and is, therefore, not capable
of indemnification; Medical Payments Coverage is in the form of an
investment contract and therefore, also not capable of indemnification;
and also a claim for medical payments cannot be severed from the
bodily injury claim.
There are no cases deciding the issue of whether legal subrogation
is available in automobile medical payments claims.1s Nevertheless, a
frequently cited case which deals with the question of why legal sub-
rogation is not available is Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light
Co.14 Here the problem involved accident insurance. The plaintiff's in-
surance company sought to be joined as a party to Gatzweiler's claim
for personal injuries against the defendant, inasmuch as the insurance
company had paid the plaintiff twenty-five hundred dollars for his in-juries. There was no provision for subrogation in the policy. Despite
this, it was argued that the policy of accident insurance was a policy
to indemnify the plaintiff policyholder and that the insurer, thereby,
became subrogated to plaintiff's right of recovery for the amount of
money the insurer had to pay out. This novel approach was not sup-
ported by authority, however, even though the argument was based on
equitable assignment (legal subrogation), i.e. that where a tortfeasor
has caused one person to obligingly pay another, the loss should fall
on the tortfeasor, regardless of the lack of privity between the two.
The court, however, accepted the established view. It stated that: (1)
a life insurance policy is not an indemnity contract but a valued policy(although stating that an accident policy is not a life insurance policy,
nor an indemnity policy); (2) being similar to a life insurance policy,
the accident policy agrees to pay for injuries contingent upon the hap-
pening of an accident; (3) the amount of money paid out here had no
relation to the damages suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) the policy
is in the nature of an investment, the insured investing premiums with
the company to have the company pay him in the event of a con-
tingency. The court concluded by stating that there was no indemnity
feature present in the policy but left the contractual approach open by
remarking that:
if such a company desires protection against loss caused by the
wrongs of third persons who would ordinarily be liable they mustdo so by contracts they make; that in the absence of a feature ex-pressly making the policy of insurance an indemnity contract, it
should not be regarded as such but held to be an investment con-
tract in which only the parties concerned are the insurer and the
assured or the beneficiary.15
13 Kimball and Davis, supra n. 6 at 846.
14 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
15 Id. 116 N.W. at 634.
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The test for allowing insurers the right of subrogation in these
situations turns on the question of whether the policy is one of invest-
ment or indemnity. If it is construed as an investment contract, as life
insurance policies invariably are, then no right of legal subrogation is
available. If the policy is construed as an indemnity contract, legal sub-
rogation should be available. One writer sums up the problems by
saying that: "the doctrine of subrogation and indemnity are indissolubly
connected." 10
It remains unclear why automobile insurers failed to take the sug-
gestion, mentioned by the court in the Gatzweiler case in 1908, and make
constructive use of it until 1959 with the Special Policy. Indeed, it re-
mains a mystery why all automobile policies are not written with the
stipulation for subrogation of medical expenses. Perhaps the answer
is that the Special Policy, and other policies with similar stipulations
today, are written on the basis of competition.
Analysis of Cases Unfavorable to Subrogation
With the development of the idea that, absent stipulation, the subro-
gation of medical expenses by automobile insurance companies would be
denied, in addition to the suggestion by the Gatzweiler case as to what
interpretation would be given to policies containing a stipulation, is
there any justification for a court's refusal to give effect to the legitimate
subrogation rights of insurers, who have derived their rights by stipu-
lation?
In several recent cases, the courts deny medical expense subroga-
tion and see no technical distinction between subrogation and assignment,
or feel that severing a claim for medical expenses from a chose on ac-
tion results in the splitting of that cause.
A leading case in Missouri' 7 presented, for the first time, the ques-
tion of whether or not the subrogation of medical expenses, as a condi-
tion of the policy, was proper. The court failed to distinguish between
subrogation and assignment, labelling the insurer an assignee of part
of its insured's claim for personal injury. The insurer added to the
confusion by actually stating in an amended petition that its subroga-
tion rights were "held as the assignee of Forest Oakley Chumbley. ,, 18
From there the court passed quickly over the argument that it was
splitting a cause of action and emphasized that Missouri consistently
followed the common law rule prohibiting the assignment of a bodily
injury claim. The court should have had little difficulty in distinguishing
between assignment and subrogation. It seems, however, that the dif-
16 Katz, supra n. 2 at 279, citing Vance, Insurance, at 797.
17 Travelers Indemnity Company v. Chumbley, 394 S.W. 2d 418 (Mo. App., 1965).
18 Id. at 423.
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ficulty in distinction lies in the effect of the transactions. Both result
in transfer of rights. It is, however, hardly necessary to assume that
the effect of a transaction is also the cause. Merely because two simi-
lar causes have the same general effect does not mean that they are
interrelated. Had the court recognized the distinction, a more plausible
conclusion could have been reached.
An earlier California case19 was cited by the court in the Chumbley
case. Although the case did not involve the subrogation of automobile
accident medical expenses, the same question was involved, i.e, the va-
lidity of subrogation of medical expenses. In a confusing and somewhat
verbose opinion, the court held that California's survival statute pro-
hibited the assignment of a cause of action for personal injury. The
defense argued that both conventional and legal subrogation are equi-
table assignments and forbidden by statute. The court sketched the
development of the rules relating to the assignability of a chose in action
for personal injuries, but again the substance of the distinction between
subrogation (conventional) and assignment was not recognized. The
conclusion of the court is in direct opposition to the recognized fact
that:
neither the common law prohibition against assignability of tort
causes of action nor any statute prohibiting such assignment con-
stitutes a bar to subrogation. The insurer seeking to enforce sub-
rogation after payment of medical expenses can command all the
equities that have persuaded the courts over the years to allow
the splitting of causes of action for bodily injury and property dam-
age arising from a single negligent act, or permit the insurer to
claim its share of the proceeds of a single cause of action treating the
claimant as the trustees thereof.20
More recent cases2 1 still deny conventional subrogation for essentially
the same reasons as the Chumbley and Fifield Manor cases.
Analysis of Cases Favorable to Subrogation
No case has been found which has allowed legal subrogation of auto-
mobile medical expenses. The insertion of a subrogation clause appli-
cable to the Medical Payments Coverage, creating conventional subro-
gation, would however, seem to extend the right of subrogation to this
19 Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377, 354 P. 2d 1073 (1960);
see also 78 A.L.R. 2d 813.
20 Katz, supra n. 2 at 281; see also Kimball and Davis, supra n. 6 at 863.
21 Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P. 2d 495 (1966); Peller
v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963);Wrightman v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 116 Ga. App. 306, 147S.E. 2d 860 (1966); Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W. 2d 208(Mo., St. Louis Ct. of App., 1967); Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Ins.Co., 436 P. 2d 654 (Okl. Sup. Ct., 1968). All of these cases have denied subrogationdespite the fact that a stipulation for subrogation was a condition of the contract.
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area. 22 Some early cases in point were tried in Michigan courts.
23
Conventional subrogation was upheld in one case,24 while legal subroga-
tion was denied in another.25 A New Jersey case20 has been relied upon
as authority for upholding the right of conventional subrogation. In that
case the plaintiffs (insureds) questioned the validity of the subrogation
clause applicable to automobile accident medical expenses. They sought
the full extent of the Medical Payments Coverage and also sought a
judgment:
(a) reforming the policy so as to eliminate the subrogation clause;
(b) declaring the subrogation clause to be illegal, void, against
public policy and of no effect; (c) enjoining the defendant from
using the clause in any policies until proper steps have been taken
to protest the public interest; and (d) requiring the Motor Club to
account for premiums paid for such coverage by policy holders upon
the theory of unjust enrichment. 27
The issue of whether the subrogation clause was valid was answered
affirmatively but weakly. The court held that the legislature had vested
the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance with the authority to ex-
amine insurance policy provisions and to reject those he felt were
against public policy-public policy being a matter of declaration by
the legislature not the courts. Since the Commissioner had not declared
the subrogation clause invalid, it was not against public policy. The
court reached the proper conclusion, but the weakness of the decision
lies in the failure of defense counsel to raise relevant matters which are
inseparable from the issue. The issue cannot be resolved solely by the
public policy argument. Inherent in the issue is the distinction between
contracts of indemnity and contracts of investment and the integral re-
lation between subrogation and indemnity.
Other courts have more adequately resolved this issue. In one
Illinois case,28 the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile insured
by the defendant when it was involved in an accident caused by the
negligence of the driver of another vehicle. The plaintiff had settled
his claim with the tortfeasor and had executed a general release. In
22 For a discussion of conventional subrogation and its creation of a new right, see
Kimball and Davis, supra n. 6 at 860; Katz, supra n. 2 at 280.
23 Michigan Hosp. Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W. 2d 638 (1954); and
Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W. 2d 713 (1954); see also
Annot. 43 A.L.R. 2d 1167.
24 Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, supra n. 23.
25 Michigan Hosp. Service v. Sharpe, supra n. 23.
26 Smith v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 54 N.J. Super. 37, 148 A. 2d 37; aff'd. 56
N.J. Super. 203, 152 A. 2d 369 (1959); certification denied 30 N.J. 563, 154 A. 2d 451
(1959). For a criticism of this case, see Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chumbley, supra
n. 17 at 425.
27 Smith v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., supra n. 26, 148 A. 2d at 39.
28 Damhesel v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 2d 279, 209 N.E.
2d 876, 34 Automobile Cases 2d 420 (1965).
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this action the plaintiff sought to recover his medical expenses from the
insurer of the vehicle in which he was riding.
The plaintiff contended that the subrogation clause was void as
against public policy for two reasons: (1) that the subrogation of medi-
cal expenses was an assignment of a claim ex delicto, which was for-
bidden in Illinois; and (2) that subrogation is not permitted in a non-
indemnity insurance policy. In a brief, succinct opinion the court held
that subrogation is not assignment and that the contract was one of
indemnity, inasmuch as its purpose was to indemnify persons for medi-
cal expenses incurred as a result of an accident, not to pay a stipulated
amount for a broken arm, or a leg. The opinion, despite its brevity,
is very satisfying in that it faced the issue head-on, recognized the dis-
tinction between subrogation and assignment, realized the indemnity
feature of the coverage, and permitted the subrogation as a means of
fixing the ultimate liability of the parties. It is a matter of interpre-
tation as to whether the court considered the subrogation stipulation
when it referred to Medical Payments Coverage as indemnity coverage.
If the court was saying that Medical Payments Coverage, with or with-
out stipulation for subrogation, is indemnity coverage, the decision is
certainly against the weight of authority.
In a later Illinois case29 the same result was reached in a similar
fact situation. The lower court had held that subrogation of medical
expenses is an assignment of a personal injury claim, thus void as against
public policy. The case was reversed by the Appellate Court, and it
was held that subrogation and assignment are distinct; subrogation
operating only as a lien against an insured to the extent of the insurer's
payment. There is no deprivation of a pain and suffering recovery, and
the subrogation is not void because the Director of Insurance did not
view it as against public policy.
In a somewhat analogous situation, a Tennessee court 30 upheld an
insurer's right of conventional subrogation, although in its conclusion,
it incorrectly referred to subrogation as assignment. In another Ten-
nessee case, 31 decided the same day by the same court, the court applied
the reasoning of an Ohio case,32 saying that
it is common knowledge that a plaintiff holding an automobile li-
ability policy providing for medical benefits is entitled to those
payments when injured in an automobile accident and under the
29 Bernardini v. Home and Automobile Insurance Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E. 2d
499 (1965).
30 Tennessee Farmers' Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rader, 219 Tenn. 384, 410 S.W. 2d 171
(1966).
31 Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers' Mutual Insurance Co., 219 Tenn. 560, 411 S.W. 2d
699 (1966).
32 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 210 N.E. 2d 755 (Muni. Ct. of Akron,
1964).
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law of this state is also entitled . . . to recover for those same medi-
cal payments from the tortfeasor. If such plaintiff and his insurance
company wish to enter into an agreement whereby the insurance
company is subrogated to such medical payments, we fail to see the
unfirmness of such contract. In this state subrogation agreements
are permitted for property damage payments and we know of no
reason why subrogation should not be allowed for medical pay-
ments. Generally, parties may contract as they wish and we cannot
see that it is against public policy for the parties to contract for
subrogation of medical payments. To hold otherwise would permit
an injured plaintiff to recover twice for the same medical expenses.
This should not be permitted.33
No suggestion was made that legal subrogation was available under
the coverage, and this is in accord with precedent. Once again it was
decided that a stipulation for subrogation can create a right where it
otherwise would not exist, and again, the public policy argument that
subrogation of medical expenses is an assignment of a chose in action
for personal injuries was easily disposed of. Other cases, 34 some earlier
and some later, have followed the same lines in upholding subrogation
clauses.
At least one court has upheld the medical subrogation clause on
different grounds.35 That court did not concern itself with discussing
the distinction between assignment and subrogation. It simply held that
a cause of action for personal injuries is assignable in that state, just
as is a cause of action for damage of property.
Ohio's Position
What is apparently the first reported case in Ohio30 originated in
the Municipal Court of Akron. The defendant, Lutz, had caused an
accident with an insured of Travelers Insurance Company. Travelers
paid its insured's medical bills incurred as a result of the accident and
proceeded to file suit, against the defendant for recovery of these ex-
penses. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., who insured the defendant,
refused to honor the plaintiff's claim for subrogation of the medical
expenses. In demurring to the action, the defendant alleged that plain-
tiff's subrogation right was an assignment of a cause of action for per-
33 Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co., supra n. 31, 411 S.W. 2d at 701.
34 Higgins v. Allied American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 237 A. 2d 471 (D.C. App., 1968);
Decespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co. of Chicago, 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. App., 1966),
aff'd. 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Sup. Ct., 1967); Appeal of Mack, 30 Misc. 2d 610, 222 N.Y.S.
2d 845 (1961); Dummery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 193, 232 A.
2d 21 (1967); and Hospital Service Corp. of R.I. v. Penn. Ins. Co., 101 R.I. 708, 227
A. 2d 105 (1967).
35 Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P. 2d 10
(1965).
36 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, supra n. 32.
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sonal injury which is void in Ohio. Ohio's survival statute37 does not
expressly prohibit the assignment of personal injury claims. The court
stated that:
subrogated insurance companies are entitled to sue in their own
names for the part of a claim for damages arising out of an acci-
dent which have been assigned to them under a subrogation agree-
ment.
3 s
From there the court proceeded to find no public policy against the
subrogation of automobile accident medical expenses, adding that the
Superintendent of Insurance of the State of Ohio had failed to reject
this specific policy. In touching upon the problem of double recovery,
the court said:
if the insured and the insurance company wish to enter an agree-
ment whereby the insurance company is subrogated to such medi-
cal payments, it is impossible to see why this is an unfair or im-
proper result. If this can be done with reference to property dam-
age payments which the courts of Ohio construe as splitting a cause
of action, it certainly can be done for medical payments which
likewise are splitting a cause of action.39
It is evident that this court incorrectly referred to subrogation and as-
signment interchangeably.
This case was appealed to the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Ju-
dicial District, Summit County.40 In delivering the opinion, the court
stated:
It has been many times stated that an assignment of a chose in
action was not allowed at common law. The reasons given for the
rule were, in chief, that to permit such an assignment there would
be created a tendency to encourage maintenance and, secondly, that
in order for an assignment to be valid, the assignor must possess
the thing which he attempts to assign, and that chose in action does
not follow in this category. Over the years the courts have made
various exceptions to the common law rule and there finally
emerged the so-called doctrine of "survivability."
Under this doctrine in general choses in action may be assigned
which would survive to the personal representative of the assignor.
This rule seems now to be one of general application.4 1
The same question was later presented in the case of Travelers In-
demnity Co. v. Godfrey.4 2 The insurer brought this action for subroga-
37 Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 2305.21.
38 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, supra n. 32, at 146.
39 Id., at 150.
40 This information was given to the author by Louis Euphray, Claims Attorney for
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. in a letter dated May 15, 1968.
41 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, supra n. 32. The appellate decision, never reported,
was handed down December 22, 1965 (Ohio, Summit Co. Ct. of App., case number
5636).
42 12 Ohio Misc. 143, 230 N.E. 2d 560 (Tuscarawas Co. Common Pleas Ct., 1967).
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tion of medical expenses and property damage which it had paid as a
result of an automobile accident caused by the defendant's negligence.
There were three causes of action: (1) for recovery of property dam-
age to the insured's vehicle; (2) for recovery of medical expenses paid
to its insured in behalf of insured's minor son; and (3) for recovery of
hospital and medical expenses paid to the parents of a minor passenger
in the insured's vehicle. In a brief accompanying the defendant's
demurrer, it was alleged that the plaintiff was attempting to split a
cause of action by assignment. 43 Seeing no need to distinguish between
assignment and subrogation; nor to rehash the arguments presented in
other jurisdictions, the court stated:
the present doctrine in Ohio and other jurisdictions seems to be
that a subrogated insurance company is entitled to sue in its own
name for the part of a claim for damages arising out of an accident
which has been assigned to it under a subrogation agreement and
this is true whether it is a subrogated right for property damage or
for hospital and medical expense.44
Although the Ohio courts, in both cases, incorrectly use the terms
assignment and subrogation interchangeably, it does not appear to create
much of a problem. This is true inasmuch as Ohio courts "will honor
an assigmnent to a subrogated insurance company of a part of a cause of
action arising from the tortious injury." 45 Thus Ohio seems to have
resolved the issue favorably but using incorrect terminology, on the
same basis as did Nevada.40
Conclusion
The question of whether conventional subrogation is assignment, or
vice-versa, is certainly one which should not be raised. The reasoning
of some courts in failing to distinguish between the two terms is, at
best, strained. It is no doubt predicated on motivation. Perhaps the
failure to recognize a technicality is a means of arriving at what some
jurisdictions view as a desirable end. One writer suggests that the
entire theory of subrogation in accident and medical benefit insurance
"remains . . . hopelessly locked in a split of authority . . ." 47 Others
43 Briefs filed with the Common Pleas Court relative to the demurrer in Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. Godfrey, Ibid. were given to the author by Attorney William A.
Kyler of the law offices of Smith, Renner, Hanhart & Miller who argued the case for
the plaintiff. In the Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Demurrer, the case of Travel-
ers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, supra n. 32 was cited.
44 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Godfrey, supra n. 42 at 145.
45 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, supra n. 32 at 149.
46 Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 35.
47 Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation In Tort Law, 54 Calif.
L. Rev. 1478 (1966).
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contend that extending the right of subrogation to this type of in-
surance coverage involves a constant shifting of the loss burden and
ultimately results in a multiplicity of law suits. This would result in
greater cost to the insurer, which destroys the argument that subro-
gation would result in lower insurance rates.
48
Equally vociferous are the arguments in favor of subrogation of
medical expenses. In addition to the case law cited, one writer, in in-
troducing the "collateral source" rule, makes the comment that when
an accident victim recovers from the tortfeasor and also from the col-
lateral sources, he will "thus turn his blight into a bonanza." 49 The
very purpose of the stipulation of subrogation of medical expenses, as
mentioned earlier, was to eliminate a windfall to insureds and claimants,
i.e., double recovery.
The fact that most major insurance companies are now issuing at
least one policy providing for the subrogation of medical expenses is
indicative of their intent. So, too, is the increasing stress placed on sub-
rogation recoveries by fire, casualty and surety carriers.50 By the same
token, the courts undoubtedly recognize that most claims ex delicto
concerning subrogation involve insurance coverage, and the process is
only a means of fixing the ultimate liability of the parties. The trend
very definitely seems to be moving towards the goal of creating stipu-
lated subrogation of medical expenses in all automobile policies.
When courts are faced with the problem of whether or not to up-
hold an insurer's right of conventional subrogation under the Auto-
mobile Medical Payments Coverage, certain factors should be weighed
and balanced.5 1 They are: (1) that Medical Payments Coverage, when
subrogation is stipulated, is a form of indemnity insurance; (2) that
subrogation and indemnity are members of the same family; (3) that
subrogation recoveries result in better loss ratios to the insurer, and
consequently, lower rates; (4) that as is the case with property damage,
an accident victim should be entitled to recover only once for his loss
or injuries; (5) that the windfall of unjust enrichment is morally ob-
jectionable; and (6) that the concept of conventional subrogation is
clearly distinct from assignment.
The argument against the enforcement of conventional subrogation,
mentioned earlier, is that it will clog the machinery of our courts by cre-
ating a multiplicity of subrogation suits. This argument fails to con-
sider that nearly all medical expense subrogation disputes are either
48 See Fleming, supra n. 47 at 1547; Kimball and Davis, supra n. 6 at 870; see also
2 Harper & James, Torts 25:23 (1956).
49 Fleming, supra n. 47 at 1478.
50 This was suggested to the author by several Cleveland insurance executives.
51 Some of these factors are suggested by Katz, supra n. 2 at 281. See also Kircher,
Set-Off and Subrogation In Automobile Medical Payments Coverage, 7 For the De-
fense, No. 10, Dec. 1966.
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between different insurance carriers or between an insurer and its
insured. No problem should arise between an insurer and its insured
once the policyholder is fully aware of the policy language. There
should also be no problem between different insurance companies. An
insurer's medical expense subrogation right should be honored by all
insurance carriers. Failure to honor subrogation of medical expenses
should arise only when there is a legitimate question of liability. Never-
theless, when this situation develops, judicial machinery does not have
to be invoked for settlement. This is a matter which should fall solely
within the provinces of the Nationwide Inter-Company Arbitration
Agreement, which is administered by a division of the American Arbitra-
tion Association. This committee is today arbitrating thousands of dis-
putes between various member insurance companies. The subject matter
of arbitration by this committee is nearly always subrogation of property
damage to automobiles. There is no reason why the recovery of medical
expenses should not be included in a dispute over liability. When a
dispute is arbitrated, the insurance company against whom the de-
cision was rendered should reimburse the other carrier for whatever
amount it had to pay for damages to property and for medical expenses.
If, after the dispute is arbitrated, the insured brings suit against the
tortfeasor, the courts should allow the insured to recover only for pain
and suffering.
With the availability of this machinery and a working agreement
among insurance companies to honor medical pay subrogation claims,
the issue raised in this article should present no further difficulty in
those states where subrogation of medical payments has been upheld. On
the other hand, in those states where, for different reasons, subrogation
of medical payments has not been upheld, the issue remains.
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